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Abstract 
 
Party identification has been thought to provide the central organizing element for 
political belief systems. We argue in contrast that core values concerning equality and 
government intervention versus individualism and free enterprise are fundamental 
orientations that can themselves shape partisanship. We evaluate these arguments in the 
British case with a validated multiple-item measure of core values, using ordered latent 
class models to estimate reciprocal effects with partisanship on panel data from the British 
Household Panel Study, 1991-2007. We demonstrate that core values are more stable than 
partisanship and have far stronger cross-lagged effects on partisanship than vice versa in 
both polarized and depolarized political contexts, for younger and older respondents, and 
for those with differing levels of educational attainment and income, thus demonstrating 
their general utility as decision-making heuristics.   
 
Keywords: Political values, partisanship, panel data, latent class analysis, cross-lagged 
analysis. 
  
2	
	
Highlights of the paper: 
1.   Advances our knowledge of the nature of modern political partisanship and the 
influences on stability and change in party support. 
2.   Advances knowledge on the impact of a key structuring principle through which 
people can make sense of the political world - core values 
3.   Uses high quality data and advanced methods to study the dynamics of partisanship. 
4.   Helps us to understand dynamics in British party politics.  
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Introduction 
 
Since The American Voter it has been argued that voters rely on party identification and 
impressions about candidate image when deciding how to vote, whilst ideology, values or 
opinions on specific policies play at most a muted role. There is indeed considerable evidence 
that partisanship shapes voters’ political views. A growing body of studies stemming 
originally from Campbell et al (1960) and Converse (1964), and re-energized in work by 
Bartels (2002) and Green et al (2002) demonstrates the centrality of partisanship in shaping 
issue/policy preferences (Carsey and Layman 2006; Highton and Kam 2011; Milazzo et al 
2012), issue-proximity (Evans and Andersen 2004), issue salience (Neundorf and Adams 
2016), government performance (Evans and Chzhen 2016) and perceptions of the economy 
(e.g. Anderson et al 2004; Evans and Andersen 2006; Ladner and Wlezien 2007; Chzhen et al 
2014).	However, partisanship can itself be thought of as endogenous. It seems unlikely that 
people randomly attach themselves to parties.  
In the British context social background attributes such as class were at one time 
assumed to anchor partisan orientations (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Heath et al 1985), but they 
have lost their power to shape party preferences in a depolarized party system where relevant 
choices are no longer provided (Milazzo et al 2012; Evans and Tilley 2012). They thus 
provide neither strong predictive power nor a mechanism for understanding why people 
gravitate to different political parties. In recent decades, however, various authors have 
argued that it is possible to identify core political values that are coherent and stable in which 
individuals hold fundamental and enduring attitudes towards general moral and political 
principles like equality (McClosky and Zaller 1984; Feldman 1988; Zaller and Feldman 
1992; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Heath et al. 1994; Evans et al 1996; Ansolabehere et al 
2008). It is argued that such values inform preferences across a wide range of specific issues. 
For Feldman (1988) these enduring core beliefs can account in part for the individual's 
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attitudes towards the more transient political issues of the day. This occurs because values 
provide a heuristic that can be applied to a set of political decisions. As ‘cognitive misers’ 
(Fiske and Taylor 2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001), voters need only assess the relevance of 
the core value to such decisions rather than drawing upon political attitudes to particular 
issues on which information is often costly to obtain.  
If people hold fundamental and enduring attitudes towards economic and political 
principles, such as equality, that influence their attitudes towards political issues, it is also 
likely that these values can shape their partisanship. Such central elements of political belief 
systems can be expected to influence party preferences as voters update their partisan 
identities to correspond with their values: if values “predispose us to favor one particular 
political or religious ideology over another” (Rokeach 1973: 13), it is plausible that they can 
predispose people to favor one political party over another. Consistent with this idea, when 
opinions on political issues are measured via multiple indicators of core values they have 
been shown to have powerful effects on party choice in cross-sectional analyses (e.g. 
Ansolabehere et al 2008; Bartle 1998; Evans et al 1996; Heath et al 1994).  
These observed patterns of association do not establish whether values influence party 
choice or vice versa. If someone has a commitment to limited government they are likely to 
find parties of the right appealing and move in that direction over time, while someone who 
believes in big government should find parties of the left appealing. Party support should be 
updated to fit with core values.1 Equally, however, partisanship could provide a cue that 
shifts responses on values over time, with Labour supporters becoming, for example, more 
																																								 																				
1 The terms ‘core values’ and ‘ideology’ can be used interchangeably to denote an overarching or underlying 
orientation, which summarizes important areas of voters’ attitudes towards politics. We use the term “core 
values” to avoid confusion with the abstract, self-placement measures of “left-right ideology” commonly used in 
survey studies of electoral behaviour.	
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pro-redistribution, and Conservative partisans more opposed to redistribution if the parties 
themselves shift in those directions.  
If, as we shall argue, core values are stable aspects of voters political belief systems 
they should lead to vote switching in response to perceived movements by parties either 
towards or away from valued goals. Given that perfect equilibrium is unlikely to exist at any 
point time – electoral politics is not a system preserved in aspic - the tension between core 
values and party signals provides the incentive to switch from one party to another closer to 
the core value held by a voter. What we propose is thus not precisely analogous to the 
thermostatic model (Wlezien 1995; Wlezien  and Soroka 2005) of a responsive electorate in 
which the average expressed policy preference shifts in the opposite direction to government 
policy. Instead we propose that voters will sort themselves by switching their party 
preference in response to such party movements.2   
	
The only study we know of that examines these dynamics of values and partisanship 
directly is that of Goren (2005). He examined a range of core principles in a multi-
dimensional analysis of US panel surveys and found that partisanship had a stronger 
influence than core values in cross-lagged analyses. Goren’s analysis suggests that, as in the 
Michigan model, partisanship is ‘the unmoved mover’ of values. However, Goren’s analysis 
is of US voters and previous studies have indicated that partisanship has a stronger influence, 
at least on policy preferences, in the US than in Britain (Adams et al 2012; Milazzo et al 
2012). There is also a long-standing debate on the extent to which partisanship is as distinct 
from vote preference in Britain as it is in the USA (Butler and Stokes 1974; Heath and Pierce 
																																								 																				
2 This is not dispute that voters’ expressed policy preferences are likely to be influenced by the activities of 
governments. As a government moves to left, the electorate will probably on average move to the right. The 
thesis of a moving centre has been advanced fruitfully in the British case by Bartle et al (2011) for 
understanding election outcomes. However, fundamental to the core values approach is the idea that the stability 
of voters’ core values is likely to be substantially higher than that of their policy preferences. It is this which 
leads to their switching parties rather than values.	
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1992; Sanders and Brynin 1999), which suggests why its relative influence might differ. We 
return to these issues in the discussion.   
In the rest of the paper we develop and test the argument that core values dynamically 
shape partisanship rather than vice versa. We proceed by first examining the nature of core 
values in the British context and why these core values are likely to be more influential than 
partisanship. We also consider the extent of this disproportionate influence across political 
contexts and for different groups of voters. The empirical analysis examines the association 
between values and partisanship by following respondents over 16 years across multiple 
survey waves throughout the 1990s and 2000s and establish which has the stronger effects: 
core values or party identification. We show that core values drive partisanship and there is 
no significant reciprocal effect in both polarized and depolarized electoral contexts. Likewise, 
core values have strong effects on partisanship across the age structure: for both young and 
old values matter for partisanship, but not vice versa. This pattern also holds across diverse 
sectors of the electorate: not just among the affluent and highly educated, but amongst those 
who are typically less-involved in politics, such as the poor and less highly educated. Core 
values thus appear to provide a generalized decision heuristic that limits preference shaping 
by parties and can provide a source of political stability or change. 
	
Core values in the British context 
Rokeach (1973: 169) argued that political ideologies are “fundamentally reducible, when 
stripped to their barest, to opposing value orientations concerning the political desirability or 
undesirability of freedom and equality in all their ramifications”. Consistent with this idea, 
analyses of attitudes in Britain have repeatedly found that opinions on issues such as income 
redistribution, government intervention and collective provision of public goods are 
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associated along such lines of freedom versus equality. The notion of core beliefs and values 
has been introduced to make sense of these patterns (Heath et al 1994). These core beliefs are 
not the same as an over-arching left-right ideology, as views on economic equality typically 
have little empirical connection with those on social and cultural issues. The latter involve 
distinct and often conflicting moral principles.  
In the period we are examining, and for several decades previously, the axis of 
division in British politics is very much about redistribution, government intervention and 
free enterprise. In other words, it is about economic and political equality (Bartle 1998; Bartle 
and Stimson, 2013; Evans et al 1996; Heath et al 1994; Laver and Budge 1992),3 in which 
“the basic logic of party competition in Britain remained similar to that which held in the 
1950s (…) a predominantly left-right dimension of competition” (Webb 2004: 39). The 
Labour Party has generally been the advocate of leftist, redistributive positions, while the 
Conservative Party has a long-standing reputation for holding more right-wing, free market 
positions.4  These values have been central to British political debate and public responses to 
it for decades. But are they likely to be shaped by party or vice versa?  
Core political values are thought to develop early in the adult life cycle and to persist 
over time, transcending the influence of short-term political events and party changes. If 
values are stable there is less room for them to be influenced by partisanship. Conversely, the 
greater stability of values compared with partisanship should provide a basis for updating 
																																								 																				
3 In this respect Heath et al (1994: 119-120) noted that their second dimension of core values (libertarian-
authoritarian) is harder to measure and less well-structured as a dimension, as well as being far less strongly 
predictive of political preferences.  
4 The rise in immigration from the EU in the last decade has made that a matter of concern to many voters, 
leading to its growing political prominence, its key role in the 2016 EU Referendum and an increase in the 
political salience of values pertaining to social conservatism.  However, the potential for a reduction in levels of 
EU immigration provided by Brexit and the accompanying sorting of parties and voters occasioned by the 
Conservatives having firmly grasping the mantle of ‘hard Brexit’ suggest that redistribution and inequality are 
unlikely to forgo their central place in political discourse and division, even if other values currently have a 
magnified political presence (Evans and Melon 2017).   
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partisanship in response to political changes. In other words, influence should run from 
values to party not vice versa. A first step therefore is to examine the stability of values and 
partisanship. A second, is to examine whether core political values influence the updating of 
party identification or vice versa. 
Hypothesis 1: (a) core values should be more stable than partisanship, and (b) the 
cross-lagged effects of core values on partisanship should be stronger than vice versa.  
   
In addition to these general hypotheses, we examine potential conditioning influences on the 
relationship between values and partisanship. 
 
Contextual variation 
In the US, panel-based research on the temporal inter-relationship between political attitudes 
and partisanship has examined the relationship in varying contexts. Carsey and Layman 
(2006) look at the effect of issue saliency on the relationship between attitudes and 
partisanship, showing that issues have more impact when they are salient (c.f. Abramowitz 
and Saunders 1998). Dancey and Goren (2010) demonstrate the impact of media attention in 
accentuating the strength of updating between issues and partisanship. While Highton and 
Kam (2011) find that issue polarization influences the direction of influence in updating 
beliefs: Issue convergence appears to weaken the effect of issues on partisanship as it strips 
away the relevance of issue positions to party choice.  
In the British case, the main parties ideologically converged in the mid/late 1990s 
(Budge 1999; Bara and Budge 2001, Bara 2006), as well as converging in their social 
composition (Heath 2015, 2016). This suggests that the impact of issues on partisanship 
should weaken in a more depolarized context. Milazzo et al (2012) find that the effects of 
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issues on partisanship declined over time as the British party system depolarized. However, 
most of these studies examine attitudes towards potentially transient political issues of the 
day rather than underlying values. To the degree that core values are more central elements of 
political belief systems than partisanship, they should function as heuristics that provide a 
basis of party choice even when parties are not polarized. Coefficients generally may be of 
weaker magnitude, but the strength of influence of core values relative to that of partisanship 
should persist.   
Most of the period covered by the BHPS has been characterized by similarity between 
the main parties in their respective positions on inequality and redistribution, as ‘New 
Labour’ muddied the ground between itself and the Conservatives and thus weakened the 
distinctiveness of their signals to voters (Green 2007; Green and Hobolt 2008; Adams et al 
2012). However, the period before 1997 was marked by larger differences between the main 
parties. The 1997 election represented a step change in perceptions of party convergence 
(Budge 1999; Bara and Budge 2001; Evans and Tilley 2017). To examine the contextual 
robustness of the relative impact of values on partisanship we can therefore compare models 
for the period before the 1997 election with those for 1997 onwards. Although we might 
expect to see generally weaker effects in the latter, depolarized context, core values should 
still be relatively more stable and have relatively stronger cross-lagged effects than 
partisanship. 
Hypothesis 2: in both more and less polarized contexts (a) core values should be more 
stable than partisanship and (b) the cross-lagged effects of core values on 
partisanship should be stronger than vice versa.  
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Variation by voter characteristics 
Younger and older voters. Central to an understanding of the relative centrality of values and 
partisanship to political beliefs is the timing of their emergence in someone’s political 
understanding. If attitudes are well-formed – as indicated by their stability – at an earlier 
point in adult political socialization they are more likely to influence the adoption of attitudes 
formed at a later point (Abramson 1979; Jennings 1989; Alwin and Krosnick 1991). If 
partisanship precedes and influences someone’s values we would expect to see evidence of 
its cognitive presence earlier in the life cycle. If values influence partisanship then we would 
expect them to stabilize earlier and condition responses to partisan cues. 
Hypothesis 3: (a) core values should be more stable than partisanship at an earlier 
age, and (b) the cross-lagged effects of core values on partisanship should be 
stronger than vice versa.  
More or less educated voters. If core values are widespread and meaningful we would expect 
them to be consequential for partisanship throughout the electorate. Both ‘sophisticated’ and 
‘unsophisticated’ voters should hold values independently of partisan cues. So although we 
could expect the less politically aware to have less stable core values than the more aware 
(Bartle 2000), those values are still likely to be relatively more stable than, and influential on, 
partisanship than vice versa. Not only can political sophisticates be expected to bring their 
partisan attachments into line with their values, so can the politically unsophisticated. We test 
this by using educational level as a proxy for political sophistication to examine the relative 
impact of core values and partisanship among politically informed and uninformed voters.5	
																																								 																				
5 This is a particularly interesting test of the relevance of values as partisanship has been argued by some to be a 
more important heuristic for less politically aware voters who do not want to expend the extensive costs in time 
and cognitive involvement required to make sense of politics. In comparison with uninformed voters, politically 
aware citizens are more interested in politics, follow debates, and are more likely to update partisanship in line 
with their values (Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012; Zaller 1992). On this account, there should be an interaction 
between level of political sophistication and direction of influence.   
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Hypothesis 4: The (a) stability and (b) strength of the cross-lagged effects of core 
values on partisanship will be stronger than vice versa across regardless of level of 
education.	
The rich and the poor. In addition to their appeal to the less politically involved, we might 
also expect core values that concern, specifically, inequality and redistribution to provide a 
heuristic that shapes the political preferences of voters across income levels. Income 
inequality is likely to make these core values relevant to political preference formation via a 
desire for redistribution by the poor, and endorsement of the free market and opposition to 
redistribution by the wealthy. Redistribution taps into the concerns of both rich and poor, 
even if in opposing ways (Meltzer and Richard 1981). It is perhaps not surprising then that 
analyses using very similar instruments to the core values operationalized here find stable and 
persisting divisions between income groups on redistribution, even when parties themselves 
have de-polarized on these issues (Evans and Tilley 2012).  
 Hypothesis 5: The (a) stability and (b) strength of the cross-lagged effects of core 
values on partisanship will be stronger than vice versa across levels of income. 
 
Method 
Data 
As we are interested in the long-term relationship between individual’s party identification 
and their core values we use panel data that tracks individual-level changes over an extensive 
time period. For this we use data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), an annual 
face-to-face, stratified random sample survey of occupants of British households that began 
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in 1991.6 Besides numerous questions on the socio-economic status of households and 
individuals, the BHPS asks respondents’ partisanship. The survey also includes a six-item 
socialist/laissez faire scale of core values developed by Heath et al. (1994) in seven waves 
between 1991 and 2007.7 This extensive time-coverage gives us the opportunity to analyze 
the individual-level dynamics of core values and party identification across a lengthy period 
in British politics. 
The BHPS contains respondents from England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
but we restrict our sample to respondents domiciled in England. The ‘two-party-plus’ system 
pitting Labour against the Conservatives with the Liberal Democrats as the main minor party 
operates in pure form only in England. Elsewhere, parties focused on nationalist concerns 
make the choice set more complex. The number of observations is also reduced for model 
estimation purposes by only including those respondents that took part in at least three 
waves.8 This leaves 7,582 respondents of which 80% entered the first wave of the panel in 
1991.  
Measuring core political values 
The labels ‘left’ and ‘right’ (or ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’) can be employed as shortcuts that 
help citizens connect their underlying ideological/value predisposition to specific policy 
preferences (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). Similarly, 
political parties and commentators use these labels to describe whole packages of policies 
(Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al 2006). However, it is unclear how respondents interpret 
																																								 																				
6 More information on the BHPS is available at: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps. 
7 The years in which the battery of questions was included are 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2007. 
Waves in which the values items were not asked were excluded from the analysis.  
8 Some 46% of our respondents took part in all seven waves in which the ideology items were asked. Another 
19% only missed one wave. Less than 10% of the respondents in our final model have only three valid 
responses. The model can be viewed as a hierarchical setup with responses nested within individuals. Missing 
responses mean less information per individual, but maximum likelihood estimates are still consistent. 
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such labels, so we do not measure them by asking people whether they are ‘left-wing’ or 
‘right-wing’9, but instead use six observed indicators that refer to examples of either a left or 
right-wing value position. In this we follow, for example, Ansolabehere et al. (2008) who use 
multiple survey items to measure latent dimensions of values and beliefs, and demonstrate 
their predictive validity for vote choice in U.S. Presidential (Ansolabehere et al 2008) and 
Congressional elections (Ansolabehere et al 2006).   
 Heath and his colleagues (1994) developed and validated a scale to measure core 
values by drawing up a list of items designed to cover the main theoretical components of the 
core ‘socialist versus laissez faire’ value domain.10	To measure socialist/laissez-faire values 
they designed items to tap into collectivism and individualism, government intervention and 
free enterprise, and economic and political equality. These items were asked in an 
agree/disagree format with five response categories. Since the aim was to design scales that 
could be used over a period of many years, the items did not address topical policy issues, but 
were framed as questions about general principles that could be asked in future studies when 
the specific political issues of the day might have changed. Most items were designed 
specifically for the scale. The items in the final six-item, core values scale were obtained via 
an item selection procedure designed to tap into collectivism and individualism, government 
intervention and free enterprise, and economic and political equality while maintaining 
acceptable levels of inter-item reliability. This scale was consequently included in multiple 
waves of the BHPS, where respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed 
																																								 																				
9 Heath et al (1994) demonstrated that left-right self-placement had lower levels of stability and weaker 
predictive validity than the core values scale, especially among less educated respondents.  
10 Heath et al (1994) also developed a libertarian-authoritarian values scale.  However, because of the relatively 
minor political importance of libertarian-authoritarian values in the years covered by the BHPS, it did not 
include the scale in any of its waves. 
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(strongly agree 1; agree 2, neither agree nor disagree 3; disagree 4; strongly disagree 5)11 with 
the following statements: 
A: Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth (reversed) 
B: Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership 
C: There is one law for the rich and one for the poor 
D: Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems (reversed) 
E: It is Government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one 
F: Strong trade unions are needed to protect employees working conditions and wages 
 
Measuring party identification 
In each wave respondents receive the following question battery: “Generally speaking, do 
you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?” Respondents who answer 
“yes” are asked “which one”. Respondents who answer “no” are asked two follow-up 
questions that first ask if they think of themselves as “a little closer to one political party than 
to the others.” If they still reply “no”, they are asked “if there was a General Election 
tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support.” In 
keeping with much of the literature (Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994; Green et al. 2002), we 
only consider as partisans those who responded “yes” to the first two questions, excluding 
respondents who only express support for a party in the event of an election. At each time 
point, respondents are assigned to the following: (1) Labour; (2) Conservative; or (3) not 
supporting any of the major parties. This latter category includes 43% of the respondents: 9% 
identify with the Liberal Democrats; 1% with any of the other smaller parties; and 33% have 
																																								 																				
11	Answers were coded so that 1 equals the most left-wing, and 5 the most right-wing response. Exploratory 
factor analysis confirms they load on only one factor. The items have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.65, indicating a 
reasonably high degree of inter-item correlation.	
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no party identity. As shown in Appendix 1, analyses distinguishing Liberal Democrats 
produce substantively the same results.  
Measurement of conditioning variables and controls  
Numerous analyses of British Election Survey data (cf. Butler and Stokes 1974; Heath et al 
1991; Heath et al 1994; Evans et al 1996) suggest that a range of socio-demographic 
characteristics are important for capturing individual differences in both party support and 
values, and we model partisanship and values as a function of these observed individual 
attributes.  Age is coded as categorical, dividing respondents into six categories (15-24, 25-
34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+) to allow comparison of effects across age groups.  Income is 
measured as total individual annual income from wages and transfers. We use income 
quintiles for each panel wave, dividing the respondents in five groups from annual bottom to 
top-20% income.12 Education is coded as respondent's highest qualification achieved. We 
recoded the original 13-category variable to a six-category education variable with the 
following highest qualifications: 1. no qualifications, 2. less than O-levels, 3. O-levels, 4. A-
levels, 5. other degree (e.g. teaching or nursing) and 6. university degree. Other socio-
demographic controls included in the BHPS include gender, social class and housing status. 
Social class is measured using the European Socio-economic classification (Rose and 
Harrison 2010). Besides using detailed occupational codes (based on ISCO88), it uses an 
individual's supervisory status and (for employers) number of employees to determine class 
positions. Housing status distinguishes between homeowners, mortgage holders, private 
renters, and those in social housing.  
 
																																								 																				
12 We use the imputed income data provided by the BHPS. For more information on the income variables and 
the imputation process see Jenkins (2011), chapter 4. 
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Analysis 
Although political values can be thought of as lying on a continuum, typically measured via 
additive Likert scales, we focus our primary analysis on their qualitative character.  It is 
common to talk of left versus right and these constructs are likely to cluster responses to 
individual items accordingly. In the same way as we can examine whether people update 
their partisanship by, for example, moving from being a Labour to a Conservative partisan, 
we can examine whether people move from being left-wing to being right-wing in their value 
positions from one time point to the next. Since we also treat choice of party as nominal and 
are primarily interested in switching between left and right-wing political choices this 
approach allows direct comparisons of the strength of effects of values on partisanship. For 
the cross-lagged analysis, in particular, this degree of measurement equivalence provides 
important information for interpreting the relative strength of their effects.  
For this purpose we use latent class analysis (LCA). LCA is a categorical data 
reduction method analogous to factor analysis.13 The main feature of LCA is the ability to 
investigate relationships among categorical or ordinal variables assuming local independence 
between these indicators. This can be undertaken for the six values items to reveal their latent 
structure, and also for the partisanship measure. Numerous previous analyses of the dynamics 
of party identification have found measurement error to be endemic (e.g. Green and 
Palmquist 1990, 1994; Green et al. 2002). We can therefore specify ‘true’ partisan 
identification as a latent variable measured imperfectly by observed individual choices. This 
																																								 																				
13 The appropriateness of the LCA method is also suggested by tests conducted during the development of the 
items. When the scale was divided arbitrarily into three broad categories, the associations between the scale and 
other variables were more or less unaffected (Heath et al. 1994: 127). 
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results in a single-indicator latent variable model where partisan identification, the indicator, 
is measured on multiple occasions (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004).14 
LCA estimation 
Our latent class model of the latent value position of respondent i 𝛿! can be expressed as (see 
McCutcheon 1987; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004): 
𝛿! =  𝑃( 𝒚!) =  𝜋!"!!!!  𝑃  𝑦!" 𝑐)!!!!   
(1) 
where 𝑃( 𝒚!) is the probability of a specific observed response pattern of the six indicator 
variables j 𝒚!  = (𝑦!!,..., 𝑦!!). 𝜋!" represents the probability of respondent i being in one of the 
discrete latent classes C (c=1,2,3), and the local independence assumption is met by 𝑃( 𝒚!), 
as the specific response to each single survey item by each respondent (𝑦!") solely depends 
on the latent class a respondent is classified into once measurement error is taken into 
account.15 Each of our six indicators is linked to the latent value 𝛿!  via conditional 
probabilities, which are comparable to factor loadings in a factor analysis. The conditional 
probabilities of the model and the distributions of the three latent classes – leftist, centrist and 
rightist – on the six-item additive index score are reported in Appendix 3, which also presents 
further information on the LCA analysis. The latent classes distinguish the value positions 
very effectively. For example, 94% of respondent who were classified as left agreed that 
																																								 																				
14	As well as estimating the relationship between latent classes for the values scales and those for partisan 
identification, we include analyses using linear Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) estimation as robustness 
checks in Appendix 2. These model use continues-level versions of our two key variables - core values and 
partisanship - by for example measuring party attachments use a 7-point scale ranging from strong Labour to 
strong Conservatives, mimicking the empirical approach used by for example Goren (2005).    	
15 As we cannot directly observe the values of a person, we need to utilize manifest or observed variables that 
help us to approximate the ‘true’ political belief. However, these indicator variables 𝑦! do not perfectly reflect 
the underlying latent variable they are supposed to measure. Hence, responses to these will have some 
measurement error, an expected mean of zero, and are uncorrelated with each other and the latent variable. 
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‘public services ought to be state owned’, while 63% of those classified as right disagreed 
with this statement. The remaining items have similar conditional probabilities depending on 
the classification of respondents. The modal category for each classification is always correct. 
Table 1 presents the mean distribution of political values across these three different 
classes. It can be seen that 58% of the respondents of the BHPS are classified as centrist, 
about 20% have coherent leftist values, and 22% rightist political values. Table 1 also reports 
the proportion of party identifiers in each of the latent classes. It shows that the values 
classification is able to distinguish the partisanship of each class very effectively. The modal 
category of each latent class is as expected. For example, 58% of leftists are also Labour 
partisans, while only 5% support the Conservative party. The clear ideological distinction of 
partisans is also obvious for those with right-wing values. Those classified as centrist are 
most likely not to have a party identification or to support a smaller party. 
 
	 	 	 Table	1:	Latent	values	and	partisanship	(in	%)	
	
Core	values:	
Classification	
	 Centrist	 Leftist	 Rightist	
Estimated	proportion	 58	 20	 22	
Observed	party	identification	(PID)	
No/other	PID	 52	 37	 28	
Labour	 27	 58	 05	
Tories	 20	 05	 66	
 
 
 
Modeling the dynamics of partisanship and values 
We use cross-lagged models to analyze the dynamics of partisanship and values. These allow 
us to simultaneously estimate 1) the effect of previous partisanship on current values, while 
controlling for previous values and 2) the effect of previous value positions on partisanship, 
while controlling for previous partisanship. As we employ discrete categories – leftist versus 
rightist values, Labour versus Conservative partisanship - we use maximum likelihood 
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estimation in a series of multi-nominal logit models.  The final cross-lagged model of values 
and partisanship (both treated as categorical latent variables) can be summarized as follows: 
 
𝑃 𝑃𝐼𝐷! 𝒚! ,𝒙!)=    …!!!!! 𝑃 𝜃!  𝒙!!
!
!!!! )  𝑃 𝜃!  𝜃!!!
!
!!! )  𝑃 𝜃!  𝛿!!!!!!! )  𝑃 𝑃𝐼𝐷!"  𝜃!!!!! )   
(2) 
 
 𝑃 𝒚! 𝑃𝐼𝐷! ,𝒙!)=    …!!!!! 𝑃 𝛿!  𝒙!!
!
!!!! )  𝑃 𝛿!  𝛿!!!
!
!!! ) 𝑃 𝛿!  𝜃!!!!!!! )    𝑃 𝑃𝐼𝐷!"  𝜃!!!!! )  
(3) 
 
whereas 𝑃𝐼𝐷! in model (2) is the observed party identification of respondent i, which is 
conditioned on the observed response pattern of the six value position indicators j 𝒚!  = 
(𝑦!!,..., 𝑦!!) and covariates 𝒙𝒊,𝟎 on the initial state of partisanship.  This model specifies the 
nominal level variable measuring latent party support 𝜃!,!, to be a function of partisanship as 
reported by the BHPS respondent 𝑃𝐼𝐷!" and a level of measurement error that is assumed to 
be time invariant for reasons of identification (𝑃 𝑃𝐼𝐷!"  𝜃!)). The value position of a 
respondent i is measured by the latent variable 𝛿!",  described in model (1) above. The central 
parts of model (2) and (3) are the transition probabilities (partisanship: 𝑃 𝜃!  𝜃!!!); values: 𝑃 𝛿!  𝛿!!!)) that account for the stability of our two dependent variables and most 
importantly the estimated cross-lagged effects of values on partisanship (𝑃 𝜃!  𝛿!!!)) and 
partisanship on values (𝑃 𝛿!  𝜃!!!)). As the models show, we control for relevant covariates 
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𝒙!! predicting a person’s (latent) partisanship (𝜃!) and values (𝛿!) when they first enter the 
panel.  
Results 
The dynamics of partisanship and core values 
First we examine and contrast the stability and change of partisanship and core values, testing 
Hypothesis 1 (a). The estimated transition probabilities for the three latent classes of values 
and partisanship based on the models described above are shown in Table A3.3 in Appendix 
3. They indicate that both partisanship and core values are relatively stable, with more than 
90% of respondents not changing their partisanship or core values across waves. Leftists are 
slightly more volatile, with on average 15% of respondents changing their latent 
classification from leftist to centrist from one wave to the next, but the general picture is one 
of stability. The cross-classifications themselves suggest that values are more likely to have a 
lagged impact on party support than vice versa: About 60% of leftists in the previous wave 
become Labour supporters, while 36% do not identify with one of the two major parties. By 
comparison only 38% of Labour supporters at t-1 were classified as leftist in the next panel 
wave. Similarly, 70% of those classified as right-wing in t-1 identify with the Conservatives 
in t, but only 52% of Conservatives at t-1 are classified as right-wing at t. 
The cross-lagged models, which results’ are reported in Table 2, confirm these 
descriptive patterns. Here we report effect coding which, unlike dummy-coding, uses ones, 
zeros and minus ones to convey all of the necessary information on group membership (e.g. 
party support and core values). This allows us to directly compare the effects of all categories 
rather than having to set one of the categories to be the reference point. In this model, both 
latent variables are dependent (at time t) and independent variables (at time t-1) 
simultaneously.  
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Table	2:	Cross-lagged	models:	Estimates	of	transition	probabilities	
DV	=	Core	
values	 Rightist  Centrist  Leftist 
 coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e. 
            
Intercept -0.89 *** 0.27  1.69 *** 0.22  -0.79 * 0.39 
            
Cross-lagged	effects            
Conservative(t-1) -0.06  0.10  0.17 **	 0.06  -0.11  0.09 
No/oth	PID	(t-1) -0.07  0.08  -0.06  0.05  0.13 * 0.06 
Labour(t-1) 0.13  0.11  -0.11  0.06  -0.02  0.08 
            
Stability	coefficients            
Rightist	(t-1) 4.47 *** 0.44  -0.90 *	 0.41  -3.57 *** 0.79 
Centrist	(t-1) -0.94 ** 0.29  1.26 *** 0.23  -0.32  0.41 
Leftist	(t-1) -3.53 *** 0.45  -0.36  0.28  3.89 *** 0.44 
            
DV	=	Partisanship Tories  No/oth	PID  Labour 
 coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e. 
            
Intercept -0.61 *** 0.06  0.72 *** 0.04  -0.11 **	 0.04 
            
Cross-lagged	effects            
Rightist	(t-1) 0.80 *** 0.05  -0.11 **	 0.04  -0.69 *** 0.06 
Centrist	(t-1) -0.10 *	 0.04  0.01  0.03  0.09 * 0.04 
Leftist	(t-1) -0.71 *** 0.07  0.11 **	 0.04  0.60 *** 0.05 
            
Stability	coefficients            
Tories	(t-1) 2.48 *** 0.06  -0.62 *** 0.05  -1.86 *** 0.07 
No/oth	PID	(t-1) -0.66 *** 0.07  1.31 *** 0.05  -0.65 *** 0.05 
Labour(t-1) -1.82 *** 0.10  -0.69 *** 0.06  2.51 *** 0.06 
Significance:	*	p<0.05;	**p<0.01;	***	p<0.001.	Data:	BHPS	1991-2007.	Effect	coding.	
Note:	The	model	includes	the	effects	of	socio-demographic	covariates	on	initial	partisanship	and	core	
values	when	respondents	entered	the	panel.	The	coefficients	are	reported	in	Appendix	4.	
 
Comparing the stability coefficients – which measure the lagged effect of partisanship on 
partisanship and lagged core values on current value – we find that consistent with 
Hypothesis 1(a), values are about twice as stable as partisanship. Table 2 also displays the 
cross-lagged effects on the updating of the two dependent variables. With the exception of 
two cases, party identification does not affect core values, whereas consistent with hypothesis 
1(b) core values have strong, consistent and significant effects on changes in partisanship.  
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The direction is as expected: Right-wing respondents are more likely to identify with the 
Conservatives in the next wave and less likely to identify with Labour, and vice versa.  
Core political values and partisanship in polarized and depolarized contexts 
To test whether these results are consistent across political contexts we split the panel into 
two periods. The first period includes three panel waves from 1991-1995 and covers the 
Conservative government. The second time period includes the four panel waves between 
1997-2007 when ‘New’ Labour was in government and the two main parties converged 
ideologically, whether measured using manifesto data (i.e. Budge 1999; Bara and Budge 
2001; Bara 2006), expert surveys (Rehm and O’Reilly 2010); or public perceptions (Evans 
and Tilley 2017).  
The findings are summarized in Figure 1, which graphically plots logit coefficients 
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals of stability and cross-lagged models for the 
Conservative (black bars) and Labour governmental periods (grey bars).16 The two panels on 
the left plot the cross-lagged effects, comparing the size of the effect for the two periods for 
core values (upper panel) and partisanship (lower panel), while the panels on the right plot 
the stability coefficients for core values (upper panel) and partisanship (lower panel). For this 
and following figures we use different scales to more easily compare stability coefficients 
and cross-lagged effects, as the former are much larger than the latter.  
The top-left panel of Figure 1 shows that partisanship does not affect core values. 
This is the case in both more (1991-95, black bars) and less polarized periods (1997-2007, 
grey bars). However, the lower-left panel reveals a clear difference between the two periods. 
In the more polarized context the effects are significantly stronger. For example, in the New 
Labour era characterized by depolarization the effect of being leftist on subsequent Labour  
																																								 																				
16	The	corresponding	numerical	results	can	be	found	in	Appendix	5.		
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Figure	1:	Cross-lagged	models:	estimates	on	transition	probabilities	of	ideological	and	partisan	
consistent	responses	(incl.	95%	c.i.).	For	full	results	see	Appendix	5.	
 
support is only b=0.34 (p<0.001), whereas the effects of leftist values were three times as 
strong during the 1991-1995 period (b=1.01, p<0.001). Similarly, the lagged effect of right-
wing core values on support for the Conservatives halved between the 1991-1995 (b=1.30, 
p<0.001) and 1997-2007 periods (b=0.66, p<0.001). In contrast we find no significant period 
differences in the stability of either core values or partisanship between the two periods. 
Sources of heterogeneity: Core values and partisanship across age, education and income 
We next conditioned the stability and cross-lagged estimates by age. The results are 
summarized in Figure 2, which shows that core values drive partisanship to a much greater 
extent than vice versa across all age groups. The cross-lagged effects of party identification 
on core values are jointly not even significant (Wald-test (df): 32.4 (24)). Strikingly, the 
stability coefficients of core values are also very similar across all age groups, which suggests 
that core values do indeed develop early in life and remain stable thereafter. In contrast, the 	
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Figure	2:	Cross-lagged	interactions	and	stability	coefficients	conditioned	on	age	(incl.	95%	c.i.).		
(For	full	results	see	Appendix	6.)	
	
figure shows the well-documented pattern of increasing partisanship stability with age from a 
relatively low starting point. We see for example, the stability coefficient in Labour support 
increases from b=2.11 (p<0.001) among 15-24 year olds to b=3.13 (p<0.001) among those 65 
and older. However, with the sole exception of these respondents aged 65 and over, core 
values are significantly more stable than partisanship. 
 Finally, looking at the results for the associations between right values and 
Conservative partisanship and left values and Labour partisanship for educational position 
and income, we again see familiar patterns. Figure 3 confirms that the cross-lagged impact 
runs from core values to partisanship in all education levels: e.g. right-wing respondents are 
more likely to support the Conservative party in the next panel wave. The cross-lagged 
effects of partisanship on values are insignificant for all educational levels except those with 
less than ‘O’ levels, for whom the effect of Labour partisanship on values just reaches 
significance. 
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Figure	3:	Cross-lagged	interactions	and	stability	coefficients	conditioned	on	education	level	
(incl.	95%	c.i.).	(For	full	results	see	Appendix	7.)	
 
As expected (e.g. Bartle 2000), the stability coefficients (reported in the lower panels) 
of political values are weaker for less highly educated respondents. For example, the stability 
coefficient for leftist respondents is 4.32 for the highly educated and 3.21 for those with only 
primary education. However, even among primary-educated respondents the stability of 
values is higher than the stability of partisanship among the most highly educated 
respondents.      
 Looking finally at income (Figure 4), we again see that party identification does not 
affect values, regardless of respondents’ level of income, whereas values consistently affect 
partisanship across all income levels on both left and the right, for Labour and the 
Conservatives respectively. We find only one significant effect of partisanship on values: 
Labour respondents in the 20-40% quintile are less likely to be leftist. All other effects of 
partisanship on core values are insignificant.  
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Figure	4:	Cross-lagged	interactions	and	stability	coefficients	conditioned	on	income	quintiles	
(incl.	95%	c.i.).	(For	full	results	see	Appendix	8.)	
 
The stability coefficients reported in the two lower panels also show that on both left 
and right core values are significantly more stable than partisanship across the full range of 
income quintiles. Even the lowest level of stability for core values is substantially higher than 
that obtained for the highest level of partisan stability. It is also worth noting that there is no 
clear decrease or increase in effect strength with changing income.  
Conclusions 
This study advances our knowledge of the influences on stability and change in 
partisanship.  It also advances our understanding of a key structuring principle through which 
people make sense of the political world - core values. The use of unusually long-term and 
high quality survey data to study the dynamics of values and partisanship adds strength to 
these claims. Ultimately, they help us to understand current dynamics in British party politics.  
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To elaborate on these points, our analysis provides powerful evidence that over the 
long-term values shape partisanship rather than vice versa. We draw this conclusion from 
cross-lagged analyses, which find that core values are more stable than partisanship and have 
a substantially stronger lagged influence on partisanship than vice versa. In ‘Conversian’ 
terminology, we infer that core values are more central elements of political belief systems 
than is partisanship. Because of the size and scope of the BHPS these analyses are able to 
range across a 16 year period in which British politics changed considerably, establishing that 
the impact of values was predominant over that of partisanship in both relatively polarized 
and depolarized contexts. This pattern also holds for young and old, more or less educated, 
and rich and poor respondents. That core values were as stable amongst those aged 15-24 as 
they were amongst older age groups is particularly informative regarding the likely timing of 
their consolidation in political belief systems when compared with the later stabilization of 
partisanship.  
The extent and quality of the panel data and the measurement of the key construct 
give us some confidence in these findings. However, the use of latent class analysis (LCA) 
was also important as it facilitated equivalence in the measurement of the key constructs of 
core values and partisanship by estimating them as latent classes. This enabled comparison of 
the cross-lagged effects as well as the stability of our instruments. By doing so, we controlled 
for the potential artifact of comparing a larger range of scores derived from a standard scale 
with a smaller one obtained from typical partisanship measures. Given this, what then can we 
infer with respect to the implications of relationship between partisanship and values in 
Britain and elsewhere?  
Firstly, we shall consider how core values help us to understand current dynamics in 
British politics. Core values appear to differ from many other political perceptions and 
attitudes that, as mentioned in the introduction, have been shown to be more strongly 
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conditioned by partisanship than vice versa.17  One key implication of the centrality of values 
within voters’ political belief systems is a resistance to political ‘preference shaping’ by 
parties. Parties simply cannot ‘lead’ their supporters. As recently noted: “non-convergence of 
the British public’s policy beliefs has an important implication for parties’ election strategies: 
namely, that the electoral “market” for clearly left- and right-wing social welfare policies 
today has not changed markedly over the past twenty years” (Adams, et al 2012: 510; see 
also Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). Core values prevent parties transforming the electorate 
into a mirror of their own positions. Instead, voters constrain parties. Moreover, the broadl 
nature of these findings across diverse sectors of the electorate – not just among the rich and 
highly educated but among the poor and those with little formal education – could put 
pressure on parties to represent the preferences of these otherwise potentially marginalized 
groups, depending on the electoral system and the presence of challenger parties.18  
So, for example, although Labour moved to a more centrist position on both 
redistributive and social issues from the 1990s onwards, their traditional supporters working 
class did not, leaving the latter relatively unrepresented and ‘up for grabs’ electorally (Evans 
and Tilley 2017). The main consequence of this increasing value discrepancy between the 
party and its traditional voters was an increase in non-voting amongst poorer voters and those 
with low levels of formal education. A secondary consequence, as Evans and Mellon (2016) 
illustrate using BES panel data, was the failure of the political left to carry its traditional 
																																								 																				
17 Interestingly Milazzo et al (2012) find that “the influence of British citizens’ policy viewpoints on their party 
attachments is stronger—and the effect of British citizens’ party attachments on their policy beliefs is weaker—
than it is in the United States”. They interpret this in terms of the higher levels of polarization between the US 
parties, which may well be the case with respect to policy preferences. However, our evidence suggests that in 
Britain core values are more influential than partisanship even in the somewhat more polarized era of the early 
1990s.	
18 In this sense, Britain can be thought to have value-based pressures for a broader, more egalitarian form of 
political representation than the US.  Researchers such as Gilens (2005) and Bartels (2008) have argued that US 
politicians respond disproportionately to the preferences of affluent and educated voters in part because they 
believe these voters are more responsive to policies than are the poor and less highly educated. The potential for 
egalitarian representativeness depends for its effectiveness however on such voters having credible alternatives, 
which can be hard to establish in a majoritarian system.	
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supporters with it as it moved to more liberal positions on social issues such as immigration 
and the EU (Ford and Goodwin 2014). This in turn led to defection over the period from 
2005-2015 as voters switched to other parties, primarily UKIP, rather than adjust their core 
values to fit with those of the Labour Party.  
Core values can also help us to understand current political events such as the 
outcome of the recent EU Referendum. If the electorate’s preferences are less mutable by 
parties and partisanship than has sometimes been assumed, then despite all of the political 
parties - with the obvious exception of UKIP - being pro-Remain, many of their partisans 
chose not vote with them. To a substantial degree, even the partisans of the pro-Remain 
parties in the EU Referendum failed to comply with the choice the parties advocated (Curtice 
2016).  
The explanatory power of core values is apparent – even if not necessarily the ones 
examined in this study.  We are, however, left with the question of why our findings differ 
from those of Goren, whose path-breaking work in this area indicated that partisanship is the 
primary driver of values rather than the reverse. There are several possible answers. Firstly, 
Goren’s analysis was undertaken with US respondents. Over the years, various scholars have 
suggested that responses to questions on partisan identity have different meanings in the USA 
and Britain. Butler and Stokes (1969: 43) famously stated that ‘the British voter is less likely 
than the American to make a distinction between his current electoral choice and a more 
general partisan disposition’. The assumption being that in Britain the two instruments are 
more likely to be measuring expressions of the same thing – party preference (Brynin and 
Sanders, 1993; Sanders and Brynin, 1999).19 If in the USA partisanship is more clearly 
distinct from vote choice, it is in a sense perhaps more ‘real’ as an independent element of 
																																								 																				
19 Though, as Bartle (2001) has noted, this could also be an artefact resulting from differences in the way that 
party identity is measured in the two countries.  
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political cognition. As such, it is likely to be more exogenous. In contrast, to the degree that 
British party preference is less distinguishable from vote intention, there is more room for an 
alternative ‘unmoved mover’ of party preference – i.e. core values.  
There is also a second possibility. Goren’s analysis was undertaken using the ANES 
panel study of 1992–94–96, a relatively short period covering just the 1st Clinton 
Administration. This finding might not still hold given the politicization of social values that 
has occurred in the 25 or so years since.  It is tempting to imagine that Trump’s recent US 
presidential election victory might represent a historic example of the supremacy of values 
over partisanship, much as we have suggested was the case with Brexit. A re-analysis of the 
impact of core values in the US could be timely. 
We need to keep in mind of course that this paper is only a first step at providing 
British evidence of the impact of values on partisan switching. It only covers the last 25 years 
or so, and it only concerns core values concerning inequality and redistribution. An important 
area for future analysis lies in the conditionality of the extent of the influence of core values 
vis-a-vis partisanship. It is possible for example that the well-known decline in the strength 
party identification in the final third of the 20th century, in conjunction with a similar decline 
in the political impact of social class produced a vacuum in the basis of political orientations 
that has been occupied by core values. In the 1975 Referendum, for example, consistent with 
the government position, Labour supporters voted to stay in the European Economic 
Community despite strong opposition earlier in the campaign (Butler and Kitzinger 1976). 
There was no evidence of such strong party influence in the 2016 referendum. Further 
research is necessary to help unravel the temporal and comparative conditions in which core 
values are more or less politically consequential and the extent to which parties shape the 
preferences of their constituencies. Also, of course, recent events on both sides of the Atlantic 
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suggest it might be fruitful to delve further into the partisan impact of values other than those 
pertaining to redistribution and equality. 
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